ACP / MCP 完善

internal/acp/permission.go

@@ -1,55 +1,16 @@
-// permission.go 实现 ACP fs/* method 的路径安全校验。
+// permission.go 暴露 ACP fs/* method 的路径安全校验入口。
 //
-// 规则（spec §5.6）：
-//  1. 路径必须以 cwd_path 为前缀（防 ../../etc/passwd）
-//  2. 解析 symlink 后的真实路径必须仍在 cwd_path 下（防 symlink 逃逸）
-//
-// 三重校验：filepath.Abs + strings.HasPrefix + filepath.EvalSymlinks。
+// 具体校验逻辑在 internal/acp/pathsafe 子包（与 handlers 子包共用同一实现，
+// 详见 pathsafe 包注释）。
 package acp
 
 import (
-	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
-
-	"github.com/yan1h/agent-coding-workflow/internal/infra/errs"
+	"github.com/yan1h/agent-coding-workflow/internal/acp/pathsafe"
 )
 
 // ResolveSafePath 校验 requested 是否安全（在 cwd 内）。
 // cwd 必须是绝对路径；requested 可以是绝对或相对（相对时基于 cwd 解析）。
 // 返回校验通过后的绝对路径（含 symlink 解析）；失败返回 CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree。
 func ResolveSafePath(cwd, requested string) (string, error) {
-	if !filepath.IsAbs(cwd) {
-		return "", errs.New(errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, "cwd must be absolute")
-	}
-	cleanCwd := filepath.Clean(cwd)
-
-	var abs string
-	if filepath.IsAbs(requested) {
-		abs = filepath.Clean(requested)
-	} else {
-		abs = filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(cleanCwd, requested))
-	}
-
-	if !hasPathPrefix(abs, cleanCwd) {
-		return "", errs.New(errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, "path outside worktree")
-	}
-
-	real, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(abs)
-	if err == nil {
-		if !hasPathPrefix(real, cleanCwd) {
-			return "", errs.New(errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, "path resolves outside worktree via symlink")
-		}
-	}
-	return abs, nil
-}
-
-// hasPathPrefix reports whether abs is equal to base or under base. Trailing
-// separator handling is critical: we want "/foo/bar" to be inside "/foo" but
-// NOT inside "/fo".
-func hasPathPrefix(abs, base string) bool {
-	if abs == base {
-		return true
-	}
-	sep := string(filepath.Separator)
-	return strings.HasPrefix(abs, base+sep)
+	return pathsafe.ResolveSafePath(cwd, requested)
 }