feat(acp): ResolveSafePath helper (3-fold check: abs/prefix/symlink)

internal/acp/permission.go

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+// permission.go 实现 ACP fs/* method 的路径安全校验。
+//
+// 规则（spec §5.6）：
+//   1. 路径必须以 cwd_path 为前缀（防 ../../etc/passwd）
+//   2. 解析 symlink 后的真实路径必须仍在 cwd_path 下（防 symlink 逃逸）
+//
+// 三重校验：filepath.Abs + strings.HasPrefix + filepath.EvalSymlinks。
+package acp
+
+import (
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/yan1h/agent-coding-workflow/internal/infra/errs"
+)
+
+// ResolveSafePath 校验 requested 是否安全（在 cwd 内）。
+// cwd 必须是绝对路径；requested 可以是绝对或相对（相对时基于 cwd 解析）。
+// 返回校验通过后的绝对路径（含 symlink 解析）；失败返回 CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree。
+func ResolveSafePath(cwd, requested string) (string, error) {
+	if !filepath.IsAbs(cwd) {
+		return "", errs.New(errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, "cwd must be absolute")
+	}
+	cleanCwd := filepath.Clean(cwd)
+
+	var abs string
+	if filepath.IsAbs(requested) {
+		abs = filepath.Clean(requested)
+	} else {
+		abs = filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(cleanCwd, requested))
+	}
+
+	if !hasPathPrefix(abs, cleanCwd) {
+		return "", errs.New(errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, "path outside worktree")
+	}
+
+	real, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(abs)
+	if err == nil {
+		if !hasPathPrefix(real, cleanCwd) {
+			return "", errs.New(errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, "path resolves outside worktree via symlink")
+		}
+	}
+	return abs, nil
+}
+
+// hasPathPrefix reports whether abs is equal to base or under base. Trailing
+// separator handling is critical: we want "/foo/bar" to be inside "/foo" but
+// NOT inside "/fo".
+func hasPathPrefix(abs, base string) bool {
+	if abs == base {
+		return true
+	}
+	sep := string(filepath.Separator)
+	return strings.HasPrefix(abs, base+sep)
+}

internal/acp/permission_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+package acp_test
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/yan1h/agent-coding-workflow/internal/acp"
+	"github.com/yan1h/agent-coding-workflow/internal/infra/errs"
+)
+
+func TestResolveSafePath_InsideWorktree(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	tmp := t.TempDir()
+
+	target := filepath.Join(tmp, "sub", "a.txt")
+	require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(target), 0o755))
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(target, []byte("x"), 0o644))
+
+	got, err := acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, target)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	// EvalSymlinks may resolve macOS / temp paths via /private prefix; on
+	// Windows the path may be returned as-is. Compare via filepath.Clean.
+	assert.Equal(t, filepath.Clean(target), got)
+
+	got, err = acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, "sub/a.txt")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, filepath.Clean(target), got)
+}
+
+func TestResolveSafePath_AbsoluteOutside(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	tmp := t.TempDir()
+
+	// On Windows /etc/passwd is interpreted relative to the current drive;
+	// use a guaranteed-outside path.
+	outsideAbs := filepath.Join(filepath.VolumeName(tmp)+string(filepath.Separator), "etc", "passwd")
+
+	_, err := acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, outsideAbs)
+	ae, ok := errs.As(err)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	assert.Equal(t, errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, ae.Code)
+}
+
+func TestResolveSafePath_RelativeWithDotDot(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	tmp := t.TempDir()
+
+	_, err := acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, "../etc/passwd")
+	ae, ok := errs.As(err)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	assert.Equal(t, errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, ae.Code)
+}
+
+func TestResolveSafePath_PrefixSiblingTrap(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	tmp := t.TempDir()
+	sibling := tmp + "_sibling"
+	require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(sibling, 0o755))
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(sibling) })
+
+	_, err := acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, sibling+string(filepath.Separator)+"file")
+	ae, ok := errs.As(err)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	assert.Equal(t, errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, ae.Code)
+}
+
+func TestResolveSafePath_SymlinkEscape(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		t.Skip("symlink test requires admin on Windows")
+	}
+	t.Parallel()
+	tmp := t.TempDir()
+	outside := t.TempDir()
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(outside, "secret"), []byte("s"), 0o644))
+
+	link := filepath.Join(tmp, "link-to-secret")
+	require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(filepath.Join(outside, "secret"), link))
+
+	_, err := acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, link)
+	ae, ok := errs.As(err)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	assert.Equal(t, errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, ae.Code)
+}
+
+func TestResolveSafePath_NonexistentInsideOK(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	tmp := t.TempDir()
+	want := filepath.Join(tmp, "newfile.txt")
+	got, err := acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, want)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, want, got)
+}
+
+func TestResolveSafePath_RelativeCwdRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	_, err := acp.ResolveSafePath("relative-cwd", "x")
+	ae, ok := errs.As(err)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	assert.Equal(t, errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, ae.Code)
+}