- Host Agent now defaults AI_PLANNER_ENABLED=true (opt-out via env), scoped to apps/device-host-agent/host_agent/execution.py only; the shared runtime.planner_config default (disabled) is unchanged. - Add openspec proposal for cloud-planner-proxy: centralize LLM provider config/credentials on the Cloud Control Plane and let the Host Agent proxy AI Planner decisions through it instead of holding provider API keys locally. Proposal only, no implementation yet.
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Context
The Host Agent's AIPlanner (runtime/ai_planner.py) delegates the actual
LLM call to a ToolCallingClient (runtime/tool_calling_client.py):
AnthropicToolCallingClient/OpenAIToolCallingClient each build a provider
SDK client that implicitly reads ANTHROPIC_API_KEY/OPENAI_API_KEY from
the Host Agent's own process environment, and build_client() selects
between them based on PlannerConfig.provider (from
runtime/planner_config.py, itself read from the Host Agent's local env).
None of this touches the Cloud Control Plane today.
The Cloud Control Plane (apps/cloud-api + packages/cloud-platform/cloud)
already authenticates every Host Agent with a host-scoped bearer credential
for heartbeat, claim/long-poll, lease renewal, and terminal result reporting
(cloud/internal_api/*), with the Host Agent importing shared Pydantic
models directly from cloud.internal_api.models rather than duplicating
schemas. Separately, packages/cloud-platform already depends on the root
Runtime package (device-agent-runtime, workspace dependency), the same way
apps/device-host-agent does -- so cloud-side code can import
runtime.tool_calling_client directly instead of reimplementing
Anthropic/OpenAI wire-format handling a second time.
A prior change in this session made the Host Agent default
AI_PLANNER_ENABLED to on (apps/device-host-agent/host_agent/execution.py).
That means every Host Agent now needs a working planner path by default,
which raises the stakes on where its provider credentials live.
Goals / Non-Goals
Goals:
- Let an operator configure LLM provider, model, and credentials once, on the Cloud Control Plane, instead of per Host Agent.
- Let a Host Agent execute AI-planned tasks without holding
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY/OPENAI_API_KEYlocally, by proxying its planner decision calls through the Cloud Control Plane. - Reuse existing Host<->Cloud authentication and existing provider wire-format code; add no new auth scope and no duplicated Anthropic/OpenAI translation logic.
- Preserve today's direct-to-provider path as a fully supported, still-default option, so existing Host Agent deployments with local keys are unaffected.
Non-Goals:
- Not moving prompt construction (
runtime/planner_prompts.py, Scene serialization, world/history summarization) to the cloud. The Host Agent keeps buildingsystem_prompt/user_promptlocally; the cloud endpoint is a thin "make this one LLM call and return one tool call" proxy, not a re-implementation of planning. - Not building per-tenant/per-host provider overrides, usage metering,
rate limiting, or a management UI for the proxy. Single cloud-wide
provider/model/credential configuration only, matching how
AI_PLANNER_*is configured today (env-based, one value cluster). - Not changing the existing heartbeat/claim/renew/result protocol or its
spec (
host-agent-protocol). - Not deprecating or removing the direct-to-provider transport.
Decisions
D1: New endpoint reuses runtime.tool_calling_client server-side instead of reimplementing provider calls
cloud.internal_api adds a route whose handler constructs an
AnthropicToolCallingClient/OpenAIToolCallingClient (imported from
runtime.tool_calling_client, already an allowed dependency direction since
packages/cloud-platform depends on device-agent-runtime) using
Cloud-side provider/model/credential configuration, and calls .decide(...)
with the request payload. This eliminates a second implementation of
Anthropic/OpenAI tool-calling wire-format translation, which
ai-planner-runtime/design.md already flagged as a drift risk for the
two-provider case -- a four-implementation case (two providers x two
transports) would be worse.
Alternative considered: hand-roll a minimal cloud-side Anthropic/OpenAI
client in cloud.internal_api. Rejected: duplicates parsing logic
(_decision_from_anthropic_response, _decision_from_openai_response) that
must stay in lockstep with the Host Agent's local transport as providers'
APIs evolve.
D2: New transport axis, orthogonal to provider selection
Host Agent config gains AI_PLANNER_TRANSPORT (direct default | cloud),
independent of AI_PLANNER_PROVIDER. direct is today's behavior
unchanged (Host Agent builds the SDK client itself). cloud builds a new
CloudProxyToolCallingClient instead; provider/model selection and
credentials for that path live in the Cloud API's own
AI_PLANNER_PROVIDER/AI_PLANNER_MODEL/ANTHROPIC_API_KEY/OPENAI_API_KEY
configuration, not the Host Agent's.
Alternative considered: overload AI_PLANNER_PROVIDER=cloud as a third
provider value. Rejected: provider and transport are different axes (a
cloud transport still ultimately calls anthropic or openai), and
conflating them would make the Cloud API's own provider config harder to
reason about ("provider" would mean different things on each side).
D3: CloudProxyToolCallingClient lives in host_agent, not runtime
runtime/tool_calling_client.py's ToolCallingClient stays a plain
Protocol; the new client is added in apps/device-host-agent/host_agent/
(e.g. host_agent/cloud_planner_client.py) and satisfies that Protocol
structurally. This preserves the existing boundary enforced by
apps/device-host-agent/tests/test_execution.py::test_runtime_owned_packages_do_not_import_host_or_cloud_concerns,
which forbids runtime (and core/device/driver/tools) from
importing cloud or host_agent. The new client wraps a new method on the
existing host_agent/client.py::HostAgentClient (which already holds the
authenticated httpx session and imports cloud.internal_api.models), so
it reuses the same request/auth/retry plumbing as heartbeat/claim/renew/result
instead of opening a second HTTP client type.
D4: Reuse the existing host-scoped bearer credential; no new auth scope
The new endpoint sits on the same internal router and auth dependency as heartbeat/claim/renew/result. A Host Agent that can already reach the Cloud Control Plane for task assignment can reach the planner-decide endpoint; there is no separate enrollment or credential to provision for this capability.
Alternative considered: a distinct scope/credential just for planner-proxy calls (defense in depth, so a compromised heartbeat credential couldn't run up LLM cost). Rejected for this proposal to keep the change additive and consistent with how the rest of the internal API already treats "any authenticated host" uniformly; revisit if abuse/cost containment becomes a concrete concern (see Open Questions).
D5: Request/response payload mirrors the local ToolCallingClient.decide() signature
The proxy request carries system_prompt, user_prompt, an optional
base64 screenshot, the tool specs (already JSON-serializable
ToolSpec/dict shapes used to build provider tool schemas), and a timeout.
The response carries the resolved tool_name/arguments (or a structured
error). This keeps the Host Agent and Cloud Control Plane in the same
shape as today's local call, so AIPlanner itself needs zero changes --
only the client it's constructed with changes.
D6: Cloud does not durably persist prompt text or screenshot bytes from proxy requests
The endpoint handler processes the request in memory and returns; only metadata (host id, tool name decided, latency, error class if any) may be logged for observability. This bounds the new sensitive-data surface created by routing screenshots and prompts through the cloud (an accepted trade-off from the earlier feasibility discussion) to "in transit and in process," not "at rest in cloud logs/DB."
D7: Proxy failures surface as ToolCallUnavailable, matching direct-transport failure behavior
Any failure calling the cloud endpoint (network error, auth rejection,
non-2xx, provider error surfaced by the cloud side, timeout) raises
ToolCallUnavailable from CloudProxyToolCallingClient.decide(), exactly
like today's direct-transport failures. This preserves the existing,
already-accepted behavior that a planner failure fails the current task
step immediately with no silent fallback to the stub planner -- this
proposal does not change that risk profile, only where the call happens.
Risks / Trade-offs
- [Risk] Cloud Control Plane is now in the hot path of every planning
step for hosts on the
cloudtransport -> Mitigation:directtransport remains the default and fully supported; operators who need offline/low-latency operation simply don't opt in. Bounded by the existingAI_PLANNER_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, same as today. - [Risk] Cloud Control Plane outage now stalls planning (not just new
task assignment) for opted-in hosts -> Mitigation: same
ToolCallUnavailable-> task-fails-fast behavior as any other planner error; no new silent-hang mode. Documented as an explicit trade-off of opting intocloudtransport. - [Risk] Screenshots and prompt text now transit through the Cloud Control Plane -> Mitigation: D6 (no durable persistence); still an expansion of the data path operators should account for versus direct-to-provider, which never touches the cloud.
- [Risk] Cloud API gains a new dependency on
anthropic/openaiSDKs and becomes a second place holding provider credentials -> Mitigation: reusingruntime.tool_calling_client(D1) keeps this to configuration and routing, not new provider-integration code; credential handling follows the same "environment or secret manager" pattern already documented for the Host Agent indocs/CLOUD_DEPLOYMENT.md. - [Risk] Any authenticated host can drive cloud-held LLM spend (D4) -> Mitigation: none in this proposal beyond existing per-host authentication; flagged as an Open Question rather than silently accepted, since it's a cost/abuse concern rather than a correctness one.
- [Risk]
ai-planner-runtime's accepted spec text ("AI Planner is disabled by default") is already stale relative to the Host Agent's actual default (changed in a prior, separate session change without an openspec artifact) -> Not a risk introduced by this proposal, but this proposal's delta spec is written against that same pending, unarchivedagent-runtimecapability, so the discrepancy should be reconciled once, whenai-planner-runtimeis archived (see Open Questions).
Migration Plan
- Add Cloud API configuration (
AI_PLANNER_PROVIDER/AI_PLANNER_MODEL/AI_PLANNER_TIMEOUT_SECONDS/provider API keys) and the new internal route, guarded by the existing host-scoped auth. Off by default in the sense that no Host Agent calls it until configured to usecloudtransport. - Add the Host Agent's
AI_PLANNER_TRANSPORTsetting (defaultdirect) andCloudProxyToolCallingClient. Existing deployments are unaffected until an operator setsAI_PLANNER_TRANSPORT=cloudand removes the local provider key. - Update
docs/CLOUD_DEPLOYMENT.mdwith the proxy configuration path and its trade-offs (latency, availability coupling, data-path expansion). - Rollback is setting
AI_PLANNER_TRANSPORT=direct(or unsetting it) on affected hosts and restoring their local provider key; the Cloud API route can remain deployed but unused.
Open Questions
- Should planner-proxy calls eventually get their own credential scope separate from heartbeat/claim/renew/result, to bound blast radius and allow independent cost/abuse controls? Deferred; revisit if this becomes a real deployment.
- Should the Cloud API expose any per-request cost/usage observability
(e.g. token counts) given it now brokers every LLM call for
cloud- transport hosts? Out of scope for this proposal's tasks; worth deciding before recommendingcloudtransport for cost-sensitive fleets. - When
ai-planner-runtimeis archived, its "disabled by default" spec text needs reconciling against both the Host Agent's actual default (from the earlier, separate change) and this proposal's transport addition -- noted here so it isn't lost, matching howedge-host-self-enrollment's design.md tracked its own dependency on an unarchived pending spec.