Files
agentic-coding-workflow/internal/acp/permission_test.go
T
2026-06-11 12:43:18 +08:00

137 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

package acp_test
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/yan1h/agent-coding-workflow/internal/acp"
"github.com/yan1h/agent-coding-workflow/internal/infra/errs"
)
func TestResolveSafePath_InsideWorktree(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmp := t.TempDir()
target := filepath.Join(tmp, "sub", "a.txt")
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(target), 0o755))
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(target, []byte("x"), 0o644))
got, err := acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, target)
require.NoError(t, err)
// EvalSymlinks may resolve macOS / temp paths via /private prefix; on
// Windows the path may be returned as-is. Compare via filepath.Clean.
assert.Equal(t, filepath.Clean(target), got)
got, err = acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, "sub/a.txt")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, filepath.Clean(target), got)
}
func TestResolveSafePath_AbsoluteOutside(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmp := t.TempDir()
// On Windows /etc/passwd is interpreted relative to the current drive;
// use a guaranteed-outside path.
outsideAbs := filepath.Join(filepath.VolumeName(tmp)+string(filepath.Separator), "etc", "passwd")
_, err := acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, outsideAbs)
ae, ok := errs.As(err)
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, ae.Code)
}
func TestResolveSafePath_RelativeWithDotDot(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmp := t.TempDir()
_, err := acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, "../etc/passwd")
ae, ok := errs.As(err)
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, ae.Code)
}
func TestResolveSafePath_PrefixSiblingTrap(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmp := t.TempDir()
sibling := tmp + "_sibling"
require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(sibling, 0o755))
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(sibling) })
_, err := acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, sibling+string(filepath.Separator)+"file")
ae, ok := errs.As(err)
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, ae.Code)
}
func TestResolveSafePath_SymlinkEscape(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("symlink test requires admin on Windows")
}
t.Parallel()
tmp := t.TempDir()
outside := t.TempDir()
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(outside, "secret"), []byte("s"), 0o644))
link := filepath.Join(tmp, "link-to-secret")
require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(filepath.Join(outside, "secret"), link))
_, err := acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, link)
ae, ok := errs.As(err)
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, ae.Code)
}
func TestResolveSafePath_NonexistentInsideOK(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmp := t.TempDir()
want := filepath.Join(tmp, "newfile.txt")
got, err := acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, want)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, want, got)
// 多级不存在的中间目录(祖先均为 cwd 内真实目录)同样合法,不能误杀
want = filepath.Join(tmp, "newdir", "sub", "newfile.txt")
got, err = acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, want)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, want, got)
}
// 父目录是指向外部的 symlink 且叶子文件不存在 → 必须被拒,
// 否则 fs/write_text_file 会跟随 symlink 把新建文件写出 worktree。
func TestResolveSafePath_SymlinkDirEscapeNonexistentLeaf(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
tmp := t.TempDir()
outside := t.TempDir()
link := filepath.Join(tmp, "link-dir")
if err := os.Symlink(outside, link); err != nil {
t.Skipf("symlink not supported on this platform: %v", err)
}
// 叶子不存在
_, err := acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, filepath.Join(link, "newfile.txt"))
ae, ok := errs.As(err)
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, ae.Code)
// 叶子与中间目录都不存在(symlink 是更远的祖先)同样被拒
_, err = acp.ResolveSafePath(tmp, filepath.Join(link, "sub", "newfile.txt"))
ae, ok = errs.As(err)
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, ae.Code)
}
func TestResolveSafePath_RelativeCwdRejected(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
_, err := acp.ResolveSafePath("relative-cwd", "x")
ae, ok := errs.As(err)
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, errs.CodeAcpFsPathOutsideWorktree, ae.Code)
}