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2026-07-13 19:45:53 +08:00

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## MODIFIED Requirements
### Requirement: Pluggable authentication hook with a safe default
The system SHALL evaluate every platform SDK route through a configurable
scope-aware `AuthProvider` hook. The deployable Cloud Control Plane SHALL
reject anonymous access outside an explicit insecure-development override, but
production startup SHALL not require configured static bearer credentials.
#### Scenario: Production starts without configured bearer credentials
- **WHEN** the Cloud Control Plane is configured as production with a usable
database and no static bearer credential configuration
- **THEN** startup succeeds and protected platform routes reject unauthenticated
requests
#### Scenario: Explicit local anonymous override
- **WHEN** a non-production operator explicitly enables the insecure
anonymous-development override
- **THEN** platform routes may use an anonymous principal and the application
records that insecure mode is active
#### Scenario: Custom AuthProvider is honored
- **WHEN** a caller configures a custom `AuthProvider` that rejects a request
or omits its required scope
- **THEN** the platform SDK route returns an authentication or authorization
error without executing its handler operation
## REMOVED Requirements
### Requirement: Python SDK supports authenticated requests
**Reason**: The deployment no longer provisions or accepts static bearer
credentials for public platform access; human operations use Cloud user
sessions.
**Migration**: Replace bearer-token SDK workflows with authenticated Console
user-session workflows. A non-human service credential model is outside this
change and must be designed separately before reintroducing SDK automation.